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ABSTRACT 
This capstone investigates the impact that tax policy has on the shadow economy in Greece. 
Greece has one of the largest shadow economies in the world and the largest in the European 
Union, with tax evasion being one of the main drivers. While previous research has provided 
measures of the shadow economy, none matches the shadow economy estimations with policies, 
laws, and agencies enacted by the government, specifically over the period in time of 1990-2012. 
This study contributes to the literature by connecting the policies implemented by the 
government with the size of the shadow economy in Greece, along with providing a new model 
based on prior versions of the currency-demand model. The study concludes by considering, a 
piece of cultural analysis to help explain why the people of Greece are so prone to evade taxes 
and enter the shadow economy. Research of Dr. Geert Hofstede’s work on cultural dimensions 
shows that Greeks have high levels of power-distance, collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance, 
all which can be used to explain why they are susceptible to keep evading taxes.  
Using an adaption of the currency demand model, the regression results show that the shadow 
economy increased with 1) an increase in the amount of people that are self-employed 2) 
decreases to the middle income tax rate 3) and with increases in the lowest income tax rate. 
These results suggest that the tax system needs a combination of stronger oversight and penalties 
because of the extremely high levels of uncertainty avoidance that Greeks possess. The results 
also show that revenue can be captured by raising the middle income tax rate, and that raising the 
tax rate on the lowest bracket will tend to force those people into the shadow economy. This 
study provides useful conclusions on the Greek shadow economy from both an economic 
perspective and a sociological perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost three decades now, Greece has been infamous for having a very large shadow 
economy and having a population that is one of the worst perpetrators of tax evasion in the world. 
The government of Greece has attempted to curtail this problem by implementing policies that 
target tax evaders, and also changing other policies to try and capture more revenue, but often 
these methods prove unsuccessful. What aspects of the economy of Greece are so prone to tax 
evasion? Who are the main contributors to the shadow economy? While many studies have been 
done on this topic, none provide a definitive way to measure the shadow economy and identify 
the main contributors to the problem. This study fills a void in the literature and matches changes 
in public policy to changes in the size of the shadow economy in Greece from 1990-2012. 
Regression analysis is used to provide estimates of the shadow economy based upon a currency 
demand model developed by Vito Tanzi in 1985. The results are then explained with an element 
of cultural analysis using the Cultural Dimensions model developed by Geert Hofstede.   
This paper will begin with a literature review, followed by an in-depth look at the model used to 
estimate the impact of various factors on the size of the shadow economy in Greece.  The results 
are discussed and policy implications are drawn. Finally, the impact of cultural factors on tax 
evasion is evaluated. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
What is the Shadow Economy? 
To understand this topic it is important to first define what the shadow economy is and what 
activities are included in it. It is a term that has been loosely defined in the past, but as research 
continues it has become more and more consistent. Dr. Friedrich Schneider of Johannes Kipler 
University is known as one of the leading researchers on the shadow economy, and his 
measurements and estimations are often used by governments around the world. He defines the 
shadow economy as “all market-based legal production of goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities” to avoid payment of taxes, avoid payment of 
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social security contributions, avoid meeting legal labor standards, or to avoid complying with 
binding administrative procedures (Schneider, 2004). These types of activities include 
unreported income from self-employment, and also the wages, salaries and assets from 
unreported work related to legal goods and services. 
Professor Schneider identifies six main causes for an increase in shadow economy activities in 
any country. According to his paper “Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: 
What do we really know?” the six main causes are: 
1) Increase of the Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
2) Intensity of State Regulations 
3) Social Transfers 
4) Specific Labor Market Regulations 
5) Public Sector Services 
6) Tax Morale 
These conclusions are based off accumulations of empirical data gathered by Schneider and his 
colleagues over many years. These categories are very general and cannot be applied to every 
nation’s economy, but some elements of these categories can be found within the economy of 
Greece. 
Developed vs. Transition Economies 
Stavros Katsios talks about the difference between developed and transition economies in his 
paper “The Shadow Economy and Corruption in Greece.” Developed nations such as the United 
States, Switzerland, and Japan have some of the lowest shadow economies as a percentage of 
their GDP. In developed nations such as these, the shadow economy has stayed low and stable 
“mainly as a result of decreased direct and indirect tax burden, of government deregulation, and 
of a liberalization of the labor markets” (Katsios, 2006). Transition economies however show 
much higher figures when it comes to shadow economy. The numbers are higher in these 
economies because “before liberalization most day-to-day products were produced in the 
underground…[because] there were very few options in the official planned economy” (Katsios, 
2006). As these states entered the transition stage of development, new government regulation 
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along with higher direct and indirect taxation forced people into the shadow economy in order to 
maintain the economic way of life that used to be in place before development of the market 
economy. 
Although Greece is ranked amongst developed economies, Katsios argues that its economy 
shows many signs of a transition economy that is susceptible to higher levels of shadow activity. 
These signs include “high levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of 
bribery, high effective taxes on official activities, and a large discretionary framework of 
regulations leading to a large shadow economy” (Katsios, 2006). Since Greece shows signs of a 
transition-type economy, the solutions for its problem are much different than those used in 
developed economies. The shadow economy in Greece is very sticky because of “the high profit 
from irregular activities, the associated investments, the strong personal relations, and the 
relative low cost of operating,” so once citizens enter the shadow economy, it is very unlikely 
that a change in tax policy will bring them out of it. From a public policy perspective, it becomes 
very difficult for policy makers to enact major reform to the current tax code, knowing how 
difficult it is to bring citizens back out of the shadow economy. It is also very difficult to make a 
reform that has a goal of lowering the shadow economy, but having that reform completely 
change the tax system for the legitimate tax payers as well. This is a major policy issue in Greece. 
Problems in Greece 
Katsio’s further explains the policy problems that arise when the Greek government cannot tax 
all the shadow activities in its economy. First of all, the initial short-term reaction of the 
government is always to raise tax rates, which of course apply to only legitimate tax payers, in an 
attempt to capture the revenue that cannot be obtained from shadow activities. The result is that 
the tax burden shifts further onto the legitimate sector of the economy, putting the pressure onto 
them rather than the illegitimate sector. In essence, these tax increases act as an “implicit 
subsidy” to the shadow economy that is “particularly ironic and troubling” considering that it 
creates more of an incentive for legitimate taxpayers to enter the shadow economy. With this in 
mind, policy changes that are made cannot just simply be reforms that either increase the burden 
or complicate the taxation process for those that are already paying. The solution must come 
from major institutional reform that focuses on increases to simplification, efficiency, and 
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limited government presence in the tax system. The following diagram taken from Katsios’ paper 
outlines some of the goals of major institutional reform.  
Categories of Major Institutional Reform 
Even though some major attempts at reform have been attempted, the Greek tax system “remains 
terribly complex and inefficient [with] no progress towards making the tax code simpler or 
making the burden more equal and visible to help limit the government’s growth (Katsios, 2006). 
Another major problem in Greece that has very obviously emerged in the recent past is that any 
kind of tax cut that has been made has never been matched by cuts in government spending, also 
making it very difficult to justify further tax reform from a policy perspective. Katsios explains 
how the Greek tax system is so complex that it creates very high administrative and compliance 
costs, along with susceptibility to bribery. Tax payers “spend millions of hours annually filling 
out tax forms, keeping records, and learning hard to interpret tax rules.” Special documentation 
is required by tax authorities for almost everything including “mortgage records for the mortgage 
interest deduction, education records for education tax breaks etc., promoting an overall invasion 
of personal privacy by the government” (Katsios, 2006). The complex rules of the tax system can 
be interpreted in so many ways that the people are often confused and subject to make errors. 
Katsios explains that because of this Greeks will often risk trying to deceive tax authorities or 
offer bribes to them so that their tax situation will be enforced in the interpretation most 
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favorable to them. The system is very inefficient and unproductive, and forces a lot of legitimate 
tax payers to enter the shadow economy. 
Corruption 
Another one of the reasons why the shadow economy is so large in Greece is because of the 
presence of corruption in the public sector. Corruption occurs when interactions and economic 
transactions between the public and private sector violate the arm’s-length principle. The arm’s 
length principle states that all economic transactions must be made without some type of special 
relationship between the two parties that may affect the price, requirements, and conditions of 
the transaction. These types of transactions are commonplace in Greece, and in fact are generally 
accepted. 
Transparency International is an international organization created to take a stand against 
corruption and expose governments and institutions who are involved in corrupt activity. They 
do this through gathering data and providing an international platform for complaints involving 
corruption all over the world. After compiling this information and data, Transparency “engages 
in strategic advocacy to bring about systemic change in public policy and practice.” Their 
website contains country specific sections on corruption, and the page on Greece contains much 
information on kinds of corruption that is occurring there. Within Greek government, public 
officials “have acted without transparency or effective oversight for decades.” This has created 
an environment where it has become the norm for public officials to demand and accept bribes, 
especially because there is little risk of penalty for those that are caught. Transparency has 
obtained a Greek report showing that in 2010 “only 2% of misbehaved civil servants are subject 
to disciplinary procedures” (Transparency International, 2012). In 2011 TI-Greece issued its 
annual National Survey on Corruption in Greece and the following table shows the results 
outlining the “Corruption Pricelist” for activities that can be paid for with a bribe. These types of 
payments are known as “speed money,” which helps to get a process done quicker through 
payment. 
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Corruption Pricelist in Greece for 2011-Transparency International 
*This is the fifth year (since 2007) that TI-Greece conducts the National Survey on Corruption in Greece, which presents the size of petty 
corruption that burdens the Greek households. The 2011 Survey occurred in four waves over the period November-December 2011, 
using a structured questionnaire addressing to a sample of 12,000 people (www.transparency.org). 
 
The fact that a survey like this is able to successfully produce results alone gives insight to how 
large the problem is in Greece. Bribery for petty services that should be expected of government 
workers is the norm in Greece. It is so much the norm that a de facto price list was created by 
Transparency International through their corruption survey. Of course only those citizens that are 
willing to pay can afford to pay, and only those that have connections to the central government 
are able to participate in these corruptive bribery activities. Those that are not able to do may 
instead to enter the shadow economy as a substitute for corruption, in order to avoid the tax 
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authorities altogether. Therefore “the shadow economy is complementary to a corrupt state” and 
both of them create incredible inefficiencies in the Greek economy (Katsios, 2006). 
A major contributor to the shadow economy in Greece is the high percentage of the working 
population that is self-employed. Workers that are self-employed have a lower probability of 
detection and oversight from tax officials, and have the ability to perform undetectable cash and 
M1 transactions through business partners that they have close relationships with. The self-
employed population in Greece is very high compared to most other countries. In 2011 the 
percentage of self-employed to total employed was 37% and it has been as high as 48% in 1990. 
The government of Greece finds it extremely difficult to monitor this group and therefore lots of 
evasion, corruption, and other shadow activities tend to go unnoticed. 
Methods of Estimating the Shadow Economy 
In order to really understand the impact of the shadow economy on a nation, it is important to be 
able to measure it. However, there is difficulty in measuring the shadow economy because as the 
name suggests, it is something that is not brought out into the light of the public sphere. 
Therefore, estimations and econometric models must be used to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy. Historically there have been various ways of attempting to do this. One way to 
estimate the shadow economy is to take GDP using both the income and the expenditures 
methods. If there is a large gap between the two figures, then this can be assumed to be attributed 
to the shadow economy, because there is more spending occurring than there is declared income. 
A second way to estimate is to use the labor force statistic. The labor force is assumed to be 
sticky over time and not susceptible to large fluctuations. Therefore if there is an unexpected 
drop in the labor force that has not been accounted for, this can be assumed to be attributed to the 
shadow economy increasing.  
A third method is the currency-demand approach. This approach is built off of the assumption 
that all shadow economy activities run on cash transactions that are undetectable by tax 
authorities. This method uses regression analysis with the currency to total money supply ratio as 
the dependent variable, and the assumption is that as shadow economy activity increases, the 
currency to total money supply ratio increases. This is the method that was used to help create a 
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specific model for the purpose of this study and the steps to get this model will be explained in 
the methodology section. The following graph shows past estimates of the shadow economy 
done by Dr. Friedrich Schneider using the currency demand method. 
Estimations of the Size of the Shadow Economy in 21 OECD Countries 
Attempts by the Greek Government 
As shown by these past estimates for OECD countries, Greece is estimated to have the highest 
shadow economy as a percentage of its GDP from 1999 to 2003. The time period being analyzed 
in this study is 1990 to 2012 and during this time the government of Greece has made efforts to 
try and reduce and stop the problems of tax evasion and the shadow economy. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit has produced annual Country Commerce reports on Greece from 1996 to 2012 
and these reports contain information on the kinds of laws, agencies, and policies that the Greek 
government has implemented from 1990 to 2012. There are three categories that the government 
attempted to reform during this time period. First the government tried to create enforcement 
agencies that would have greater oversight over financial crimes that take place in both the legal 
and illegal sectors of production. Secondly, the government attempted to update its auditing and 
database technology in order to have better cross-checking and detection abilities. Lastly, the 
government attempted frequently to reform the tax code on personal income, corporate income, 
and self-employed income.  
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There were two major agencies created over the time period of 1990 to 2012. In 1997 the Pasok 
government created an agency called the Financial Crimes Investigation Office. This agency was 
aimed at reducing illegal activities such as tax fraud, contraband, money laundering, drug-
trafficking, and illegal lending. In 2005 the New Democrat government replaced this agency 
with the Service for Special Audits. They claimed that the Financial Crimes Investigation Office 
had been corrupted and compromised as early as one month into its existence and therefore 
needed to be replaced. The Service for Special Audits was given extensive powers to confiscate 
physical and digital data, as well as to freeze bank accounts. Finally in 2010 under guidance of 
Troika, five task forces were created that aimed at creating better tax-collection techniques. 
The Greek government began to update its administrative tax software and database technology 
in 1997 through the purchase of TAXIS hardware and software. This system was implemented 
into almost all tax offices by January of 2001 and it is used to keep records of transactions and 
cross-check them against tax returns submitted by citizens. It has become mandatory for 
merchants and the self-employed to file value-added tax returns electronically so that they can be 
constantly monitored by the TAXIS system. It has even been linked to the cash registers of most 
major stores in Greece, with the intent of linking it to every cash register, so that transactions are 
instantly recorded and accounted for. This technology and its cross-checking abilities were able 
to catch a high number of evaders almost instantly after it became fully functional in January of 
2000. 
There have also been attempts to reform the tax codes aimed at personal, corporate, and self-
employed income to try and increase revenue and bring people out of the shadow economy to 
pay their taxes. Changes in the personal income tax code have been aimed at reforming and 
adjusting rates to make them more favorable to taxpayers, while also adjusting the tax-free 
income threshold to accommodate the people in the lowest tax bracket and either increase or 
decrease their tax burden. Changes to corporate taxation have been aimed at harmonizing tax 
rates for certain business entities in order to create consistency in the system. Government has 
also tried to simplify bookkeeping for corporations in order to make auditing and detection easier 
for government tax authorities. The Greek government has also created amnesty periods to allow 
companies that have been in the shadow economy to emerge and pay their evaded taxes at a 
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much lower rate than they would have, without any penalty. Finally, there have been attempts 
made to reform the self-employed tax system by attempting to remove loopholes and treat them 
the same as any other individual taxpayer that is not self-employed. Compared to the other 
categories, not nearly the same amount of action has been done here. For this project, many of 
these specific laws and policies will be compared to an estimation of the size of the shadow 
economy in order to see if they had a negative, positive, or neutral impact on it during the time 
that they were implemented.  This process will be shown in the results section of this paper. 
Theories on Cultural Analysis 
The final pieces of literature that were researched for this topic are frameworks of cultural 
analysis that are used to describe cultures of a nation and categorize them for comparison’s sake. 
For this study there is a need to have a cultural framework in place that can help to draw 
conclusions that explain why the people of Greece are so prone to evade taxes and enter the 
shadow economy.  
One of the frameworks that can be used to analyze cultures is that developed by Parsons in 1951 
which states that all people have personal pre-dispositions that enable them to make choices a 
certain way in their lives. There are four classifications of “relationships that an individual within 
a society maintains with the environment” (Todeva, 4). People are predisposed to make decisions 
that are: 
1. Emotionally charged vs. emotionally neutral 
2. Multidimensional vs. specific 
3. Universalistic vs. particularistic (refers to application of rules/laws) 
4. Ascription vs. achievement oriented 
5. Self vs. collective orientated 
In 1961 Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck developed another cultural framework using the concept that 
there are “five common human problems to which nations collectively are searching for 
solutions” (Todeva, 3). These problems are: 
1. The nature of the human being: (good/mixed/evil) 
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2. Human relationship with the world: (dominant/harmonious/submissive) 
3. Primary mode of activity: (doing/becoming/being) 
4. Individual relationship with other people: (individualism/collaterality/lineality) 
5. Temporal orientation: (past/present/future) 
 
While these frameworks could most definitely be applied to Greece and the shadow economy, 
the framework that is the most applicable to this study is that of Dr. Geert Hofstede which was 
developed in 1980. This framework was developed with the intent of being a “commonly 
acceptable, well-defined, and empirically based terminology to describe cultures” (Hofstede, 
1983). Hofstede developed five dimensions of culture that can be used to describe differences in 
national cultures. These dimensions are defined by Hofstede as: 
1. Power-distance: To what degree do the people of a society accept and respect 
hierarchy and the power held by those of high status?  
2. Individualism vs. collectivism: Do the people of a society look out only for 
themselves and their immediate families or are they part of a protective and loyal in-
group that helps all members of it? 
3. Masculinity vs. femininity: Does the culture of a nation possess more masculine or 
feminine characteristics. Masculine societies emphasize competition, heroism, and 
achievement. Feminine societies emphasize cooperation, caring for the weak, 
modesty, and quality of life. 
4. Uncertainty avoidance: How comfortable are the people of a nation with ambiguous 
and uncertain situations? 
5. Long-term vs. short term orientation: Are the people of a nation focused more on the 
short term or long term future of their society? 
This model was selected for this study for the purpose of explaining why Greek people tend to 
evade taxes and enter the shadow economy. Specifically, the dimensions of power-distance, 
individualism vs. collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance are the most relevant when looking at 
Greek culture and its shadow economy. This framework will be discussed further in the 
conclusions section. 
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Therefore after reviewing the literature, the two methods that will be used in this study are the 
currency-demand method to estimate the size of Greece’s shadow economy, and Hofstede’s 
dimensions of culture to explain why Greeks evade taxes and enter the shadow economy. 
METHODOLOGY 
Researchers have used many different methods to estimate the size of the shadow economy in a 
nation. For the purpose of this study, the currency-demand model was chosen as the best 
framework. The currency demand model is based upon information and data that is widely 
available to the public. It also allows for easy substitution of variables in and out of the model 
allowing for different specifications of the regression model. This study uses a unique currency-
demand model that includes variables that have not been tested for in prior research. 
Philip Cagan (1958) 
The concept of currency demand has been a topic of economic discussion for some time. In 1958, 
Philip Cagan of the University of Chicago wrote a chapter in the National Bureau of Economic 
Research called “The Demand for Currency Relative to Total Money Supply.” This paper 
mentioned numerous variables that affect the ratio of currency to the total money supply. They 
are as follows: 
1) The cost of holding currency: as interest rates rise, the cost of holding currency increases 
therefore people tend to hold less currency and the ratio goes down 
2) Expected real income per capita: holding balances in the checking deposits of reputable 
banks is preferred over holding currency as income rises. The services of deposits are 
safer than that of holding currency, therefore as income rises the currency to total money 
supply ratio declines 
3) The volume of retail trade: the use of currency predominates because of its wide 
acceptance, cash-and-carry transactions, assumes a constant fraction of retail transactions 
uses currency, as retail transactions increase so does the currency ratio 
4) The volume of travel per capita: travelers often have a high need for currency, so “the 
number of miles of intercity travel per capita by passengers on all forms of transportation 
should reflect the major changes in the demand for currency arriving from the 
inconveniences of paying by check when away from home” 
5) The degree of urbanization: urbanization causes people to trade where they are not 
known, reducing the use of checks, impersonal nature of urban trade discourages the use 
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of checks and credit, so the growth of urbanization will increase the demand for currency 
and increase the ratio, conversely living in an urban environment encourages the banking 
lifestyle and increases wage payment by check, decreasing the currency ratio, net effect is 
unknown, not played a dominant role 
6) Rate of tax on transactions: “some people evade taxes by making as many transactions as 
possible with currency and not reporting them to the tax collector, evasion will occur on a 
large scale if the tax rate is high enough to create a sufficient incentive, so as the tax rate 
increases so does the currency ratio 
Cagan concludes that there is not enough strong evidence to prove the relationship between the 
amount of retail trade and the amount of travel to the currency ratio. He also states that 
urbanization may have a small effect, but it is unknown as to what direction it moves the 
currency ratio. He concludes that the three most important variables are interest on deposits, real 
income, and the tax on transactions. Cagan’s methodology used time series data to look for 
multiple correlations between the currency ratio, the expected net rate of return on deposits, the 
expected income per capita, and the percentage of personal income taxed over a time period of 
1919 to 1955. The results showed a close correlation between the rate of return on deposits and 
the currency ratio. Regression calculated that the rate of return on deposits accounted for 79% of 
the variance in the currency ratio, while 11% of the variance was split between expected income 
per capita and the percentage of personal income taxed. Therefore Cagan’s model concluded in 
this period that the expected net rate of return on deposits was the key variable that drove 
changes in the currency ratio.  
So what does Cagan’s model have to do with the shadow economy? Cagan and other economists 
used this currency to money supply relationship to develop models that estimate the size of the 
shadow economy in a nation under one major underlying assumption: Shadow Economy 
transactions tend to be made with cash so that they are undetectable from tax authorities, 
therefore as the size of the shadow economy increases, so will the currency to money supply 
ratio. This assumption is the base of all currency-demand models that estimate the size of the 
shadow economy 
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Vito Tanzi (1983) 
In 1983 Vito Tanzi took the methodology of Cagan and developed it further to create his own 
currency demand model to make shadow economy estimates. In Tanzi’s model, “the currency to 
M2 ratio is expressed as a function of the tax rate, the income of the representative taxpayer, the 
probability of audit, the penalty rate, the interest rate, the inflation rate, consumption, 
urbanization and the education level” (Ariyo,2011). This model includes the probability of audit, 
the penalty rate, and the tax rate to explain r changes in the currency equation.  The model has 
been changed depending on the country of study, availability of data, and preference of the 
researcher. For example, in a study done on the shadow economy in Nigeria (Ariyo and Bekoe),  
the currency to M2 ratio is expressed as a function of the tax rate, GDP per capita, household 
consumption expenditure per GDP, the inflation rate, the interest rate, the education level, and 
urbanization. 
Once the set of independent variables are chosen, a regression analysis is conducted to determine 
the impact of these variables on the dependent variable, the currency to M2 ratio. The next step 
is to take the predicted currency to M2 ratios derived from the initial regression and compare 
them to results derived from a second regression that does not include the tax rate variable. Then 
by taking the difference between these two results and multiplying it by the M2 aggregate, the 
amount of illegal money (IM) in an economy is found. Legal money (LM) is then calculated by 
subtracting illegal money from the M1 money aggregate. This legal money number is divided 
into the GNP of an economy to find the velocity of money (V). Illegal money is then multiplied 
by the velocity of money to find the size of the shadow economy for the nation.  This model can 
be seen in equation form in Appendix A. 
Initial Model 
This study selects a distinct set of variables to measure the size of the shadow economy in 
Greece from 1990 to 2012. Some of the variables are borrowed from the initial Tanzi model and 
others were chosen specifically for their relevance to Greece. Some of the variables were chosen 
because of their relevance to the time period of 1990-2012. Internet usage, for example, was 
something that became very relevant and increased at an extremely high rate during this time 
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period. The older models used by Cagan and Tanzi provide a great framework, but for this study 
new variables needed to be chosen in order to better fit the time period in question. The largest 
adjustment was made to the dependent variable, changing it from the currency-M2 ratio to the 
M1-M2 ratio. The following is a step by step explanation of each of the variables chosen. 
1) M1/M2 ratio: In prior studies, the currency to total money supply ratio was always used 
as the dependent variable. This is also known as the M0/M2 ratio. M0 refers to all the 
physical currency circulating in an economy while M1 refers to all physical money plus 
checking accounts. For the purpose of this study M1 is assumed to be a more relevant 
measure because of the universal increase in the use of checking/debit accounts as the 
primary method of transaction in modern economies. While many tax-evading activities 
still run on a cash-only basis, it is also very likely that money can be hidden and spread 
amongst multiple checking accounts without detection by a government tax fraud agency. 
It is quite easy for a person to hold multiple checking accounts with many banks ranging 
from large national institutions to local credit unions. Therefore M0 is no longer the 
relevant aggregate when talking about a driver of the shadow economy, as illegal money 
can just as easily flow through the aggregate of M1. All of the following variables are a 
function of the M1/M2 ratio. 
2) Total Tax to GDP (TTGDP): This variable is taken as a measure of the average tax rate 
for all GDP producing entities in an economy. It is the proxy used to measure for tax 
evasion by determining legal and illegal cash which will be outlined in a later section. 
This variable is taken from the original Tanzi model. Under the assumptions and results 
made by previous research, the expectation is that an increase in Total Tax to GDP will 
increase the M1/M2 ratio. 
3) Household Final Consumption Expenditure per GDP OR GDP per capita 
(undecided, have regressions for both)(HFCE or GDPcap): This is another variable 
borrowed from the Tanzi model which accounts for changes in income. Prior research 
stated that as income rises, the demand for deposit accounts increases and the demand for 
physical currency decreases. For the time period being analyzed in this study, the same 
theory may hold true using the M1/M2 ratio. As income increases, more money flows out 
of physical currency and deposit accounts into numerous financial products and 
investment opportunities that are not included in the M1 aggregate. Therefore it is 
expected that as income rises, the M1/M2 ratio will decline. 
4) Inflation Rate (I) and Interest Rate (r): These variables were also borrowed from the 
Tanzi model to capture the cost of holding money. The expectations are that increases in 
inflation and decreases in interest rates will increase the M1/M2 ratio. 
5) Education Rate (EDU): This is the final variable borrowed from the Tanzi model. This 
is the percentage of the employed population that has obtained a secondary education. 
This variable was used by Tanzi under the assumption that people who have higher 
education will use less cash and put their money into deposit accounts. The same 
assumption holds true under this study’s M1/M2 ratio as people with higher education are 
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more likely to put money into investment products that are not part of the M1 aggregate. 
The expectation is that an increase in education will lead to a decrease in the M1/M2 ratio. 
6) Exchange Rate (E): The exchange rate of Greek Drachmas to German Marks was 
chosen as a unique variable to account for the flow of imports and exports across the 
borders of Greece. This rate is used because Germany has traditionally been Greece’s 
closest trading partner. This variable was also chosen to capture the effects of the switch 
to the Euro in 2001, because the exchange rate is held constant after that point in time. It 
is expected that as the Drachma strengthens against the Mark, currency will flow out of 
the country and the M1/M2 ratio will decline. 
7) Self Employed (SE) (% of Total Employed): This unique variable was chosen to 
capture the effects of the self-employed population in Greece on the size of the shadow 
economy. Greece has a high proportion of self-employed relative to most other countries 
and it is easier to evade taxes in this environment where there is less regulation. It is 
expected that as the self-employed percentage rises, so will the M1/M2 ratio. 
8) Personal Income Tax Brackets( Low, Mid, High): Low, median, and high income tax 
brackets are used as independents variables too see which has the greatest impact on the 
shadow economy. These variables are also unique to this study and it is expected that all 
of them will have a positive impact on the M1/M2 ratio. 
9) Unemployment (U): This unique variable was chosen to see if a change in the 
unemployment rate had an effect on the shadow economy. The expectation is that an 
increase in the unemployment rate will increase the M1/M2 ratio. 
10) Value Added Tax Rate (VAT): This is a tax rate that is uniquely different from country 
to country so it was included (at the 1st tier) to see if a change in it affected the size of the 
shadow economy. The expectation is the same as that of the income tax brackets in that 
an increase will also increase the M1/M2 ratio. 
11) Corporate Tax Rate (T): This is the rate that is applied to all corporations listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange. This variable was included to capture effects that may not have 
been absorbed by the personal income tax variables alone. The expectation is the same in 
that an increase in this rate will result in an increase in the M1/M2 ratio. 
12) Internet Usage (I): This statistic was chosen to see if the growing usage in internet from 
1990-2012 had an impact on the shadow economy. The statistic is internet users per 100 
people and the prediction is that as internet usage rises the M1/M2 ratio will fall. This is 
under the assumption that internet usage has created less of a need for transactions to be 
made with cash and checking accounts because of secure online payment utilities such as 
PayPal. 
13) Tariff Rate (T): This variable is an applied weighted mean on all products. The purpose 
of this variable is to see what the effect is of imports and exports on the shadow economy. 
The prediction is that a rise in the tariff rate will result in an increase in the M1/M2 ratio. 
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14) M1 Dummy (M): When Greece switched to the Euro in 2000 there was a tremendous 
reclassification of its currency aggregates, particularly the M1 money aggregate, 
therefore a dummy variable was put in place at the time of this switch to capture the 
effects of the reclassification. 
Problems and Adjustments to Final Model 
After running the initial regression with all of these variables, some problems emerged. The 
specific results of the initial regression can be seen in Appendix B. The first problem is that 
many of the initial variables came out insignificant and some of the coefficients came out 
unexpected. Secondly, the initial model produced a very high R-square suggesting that there may 
be high degrees of correlation amongst variables.  
Further investigation of this was done by running a correlation matrix on the model. This test 
showed that there was a high degree of correlation amongst many of the variables in the initial 
setup. The correlation matrix can also be seen in Appendix B. This evidence shows the presence 
of multicollinearity in the model, which is when two or more variables are highly correlated. 
While this problem does not reduce the predictive power of the entire model, it does affect the 
results that are produced for individual variables. In order to fix this problem the variables need 
to be adjusted. Often multicollinearity must be accepted as part of the model because it cannot be 
completely removed. The first adjustments made to try and remove the correlation were to drop 
the insignificant variables, along with three additional selections: 
1) Unemployment: This variable was dropped from the equation because after further 
thought, a “chicken-and-egg” type of dilemma came to be where it is unclear whether or 
not the shadow economy is a result of unemployment, or if unemployment is a lagging 
variable that is a result of the shadow economy increasing.  
2) Value Added Tax Rate: The VAT is highly correlated to that of the Total Tax to GDP 
variable therefore it may be creating some multi co-linearity issues within the model. It is 
likely that any changes that were made by the VAT would be captured by the Total Tax 
to GDP variable. Therefore this variable was dropped. 
3) Internet Usage: This variable also showed a high degree of correlation with other 
variables in the model. In order to remove some of the correlation in the model this 
variable was dropped. 
Another problem that was found to be present in the model was autocorrelation. Autocorrelation 
is a problem that occurs in time-series data where a piece of data is correlated and dependent to 
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some degree upon the prior period’s value. In order to test for autocorrelation the Durbin Watson 
test was ran on the variables. A critical value range of 1.494 -1.827 was needed in order to reject 
the presence of autocorrelation. The test produced a value of 1.08 showing that autocorrelation 
was present in the model. To try and control for the autocorrelation, a lag variable was added to 
the model. This variable is the log of the prior quarter’s M1/M2 ratio and can be seen in the final 
equation shown in Appendix A. 
The final problem that needed to be tested for was the presence of a unit root in the time-series. 
If a unit root is present then a shock in the data can have permanent effects on the growth rate of 
the predicted M1/M2 variable. The Dickey-Fuller test was run on the model to test for the 
presence of a unit root. The test needs to generate a number that is more negative than -4.04 in 
order to deny the presence of a unit root.  
The refined regression was ran after removing the unwanted and insignificant variables, adding 
the lag variable for autocorrelation, and running the Dickey-Fuller test. The results of the refined 
model can be seen in Appendix C. The regression produced no insignificant variables, as shown 
by the low P-values for each variable. The R-square value remained very high suggesting that 
correlation may still be present in the model. Another correlation matrix was used to see how 
much correlation remained. The matrix can be seen in Appendix C as well. The matrix still 
shows that some variables are strongly correlated, but the presence of correlation is much lower 
than in the original model. The Dickey-Fuller test produced a value of -7.2009, so the presence 
of a unit root can be denied which is very good. The Durbin-Watson test produced a value that 
was closer to the critical range but still outside of it, suggesting that autocorrelation is still 
present in the model, but to a lesser degree than in the original setup of the model. Therefore 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation must be accepted in this refined model. Even though it is 
still present after adjustments, it is present to a much lesser degree than in the original model. 
RESULTS 
The results of the regression analysis generated three results that stood out. The first is that the 
self-employed population is the greatest driver of the shadow economy in Greece, as predicted. 
The second result that stood out was an unexpected result showing that as the middle income tax 
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rate rises, the size of the shadow economy actually decreases. The third result that stood out was 
that raising the lowest income tax rate increases the size of the shadow economy, which came 
out as predicted.  
According to the Tanzi-style model of measuring the shadow economy, the regression was ran a 
second time without the TTGDP variable in place. Using residual outputs in Microsoft Excel, the 
predicted M1/M2 ratios were taken from both regressions, and the difference between the two 
was multiplied by M2 in order to find the amount of illegal money in the Greek economy. 
Instead of subtracting this amount from M1 to get legal money as in the Tanzi model, illegal 
money was subtracted from M2 in order to stay consistent with the shifts upwards in money 
aggregates that had been used throughout the model in this study.  Legal money was then divided 
into GDP to get the velocity of money, which was then multiplied by illegal money to calculate 
the size of the shadow economy. This was divided by GDP in order to show shadow economy as 
a percentage of GDP.  This process is explained in more detail in Appendix A and the results are 
shown in Appendix D in graph format. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As mentioned in the literature review, the Greek government has attempted to stop the shadow 
economy problem in Greece numerous times from 1990 to 2012 through numerous laws, policies, 
and agencies. The graph in Appendix D has specific data points shown on it which are matched 
to specific laws, policies, and agencies shown in Appendix E. A breakdown of each data point 
and the implied effects of each situation are also shown in Appendix E. The data shows slow 
growth of the shadow economy from about 13% to 20% from 1990 to about 2000. In the year 
2000 there is a strong increase in the shadow economy, going as high as 28% of GDP in 2003. 
After this point in time there is a consistent decline in the size of the shadow economy down to 
about 15% in 2010. In 2012 there seem to be signs of another sharp increase occurring but it is 
too soon to tell if this is actually happening. The estimates generated by the model in the study 
produce estimates very similar to that of Dr. Schneider which were done for 1999 to 2003. This 
is encouraging and gives confidence that the model produced fairly accurate results. 
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Hofstede’s Framework 
In order to draw conclusions as to why the people of Greece are so prone to enter the shadow 
economy and evade taxes, Hofstede’s dimensions of culture are used as a cultural framework. 
Three of Hofstede’s dimensions were chosen for the purpose of this study: 
1. Power Distance: Greece is a nation that has a high score when it comes to power-distance. 
This means that the people of Greece believe that power holders have more benefits than 
those without power, and that this inequality should be respected and accepted.  
There are some policy implications that go along with Greece having a high power-distance 
score. Since people accept inequality and hierarchy in Greece, government officials have no 
problem demanding bribes and the citizens have no problem paying the bribes demanded of them. 
Those that demand bribes will never be questioned by those below them since this behavior is 
accepted as a part of the hierarchy in Greek society. This means that policy makers must increase 
oversight on tax officials that demand bribes, and increase penalties for those that are caught so 
that the officials must respect the power that has been placed upon them and accept it without 
question. Without policies like this the government officials will continue to demand bribesand 
corruption will continue to run rampant in Greece. 
2. Individualism vs. Collectivism: Greece is a collectivist culture. People are born into 
strong in-groups that protect one another in exchange for loyalty. More powerful 
members of in-groups are expected to help those that are less fortunate within the in-
group. In-groups expand much further than just immediate family and friends. They can 
include coworkers and business relationships as well. 
In collectivist cultures everybody “knows a guy” that can help them in some way by giving them 
a favorable situation that not everyone has access to. For example, if an in-group of Greeks 
includes a powerful tax official, it is expected that the official will help members of the in-group 
get favorable tax situations in exchange for bribes. The implications of making policies in a 
collectivist culture are that people will not hesitate to bend and break the law in order to help out 
those within their in-group. Deterrents must be stronger so that the fear of punishment is stronger 
than the need to help a member of an in-group. If punishment and oversight is strong enough, 
then shadow activities may actually put the entire in-group at risk of detection, therefore putting 
pressure on them to emerge the entire in-group from the shadow economy. 
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3. Uncertainty Avoidance: Greece has the highest score in the world for this dimension. 
Greeks are not comfortable in ambiguous and uncertain situations. They crave peace of 
mind and therefore will bribe and pay to have their worries taken care of when things are 
not certain.  
Greece’s extremely high uncertainty avoidance level means that the people are always uneasy 
and worried about the future. This is why they bribe officials to take care of their problems for 
them quickly. The official gets paid, the worry is taken care of, and both parties walk away with 
peace of mind. If the Greek government can continue to update its monitoring and cross-
checking capabilities in the tax system, it will make citizens that evade and participate in the 
shadow economy uneasy because of the higher probability of detection. Institutional reform will 
make the future uncertain for those that are in the shadow economy, especially if penalties 
increase along with oversight. If this happens, Greeks may become less likely to participate in 
the shadow economy because the future results of doing so will become much more risky, 
ambiguous, and uncertain. 
Final Conclusions 
Yes, government tax policy has led to a large shadow economy in Greece. There is not nearly 
enough oversight and punishment to government officials that demand bribes and perform other 
acts of corruption. The penalties for individual and corporate tax evasion are still not strong 
enough to stop people from participating in the shadow economy. There is an exceptionally low 
amount of oversight placed on the self-employed sector, even though it has been proven that they 
are the greatest driver of shadow economy activities. 
The solutions to this problem are not easy, especially with all of the political turmoil that is 
occurring currently in Greece. But this study shows that if the shadow economy is going to be 
decreased then the government is going to have to increase punishment and oversight in order to 
take advantage of the extremely high levels of uncertainty avoidance that the people of Greece 
have. If the government can find a way to make Greeks in the shadow economy uncertain 
enough about their future that they will emerge and pay their taxes, then the revenue that has 
been lost in the shadow economy will begin to appear. 
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Appendix A - The Model 
 
ln(M1t/M2t) = β0 + β1 ln(TTGDPt) + β2 ln(HFCEt) + β3 ln(D/Mt) 
+ β4 ln(SEt) + β5 (lowt) + β6 (midt) + β7 (Mt) + β8 ln(M1t-1/M2t-1) 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable = M1/M2:  Ratio of M1 money aggregate to total money supply (M2) 
TTGDP: Total tax to GDP, the proxy for changes in the size of the shadow economy 
HFCE: Household final consumption expenditure 
D/M: Exchange rate of Greek Drachmas to German Marks, Greece’s closest trading partner 
SE: % of total employed that are self-employed in Greece, most notorious tax evaders 
Low, mid: Lowest and median personal income tax rates 
M: M1 “dummy variable used to capture the revaluation of M1 that occurred in 200 because of the switch to the 
Euro common currency 
(M1t-1/M2t-1):  The lag variable to control for autocorrelation. It is the predicted (M1/M2) from the previous period 
Finding the Shadow Economy (Tanzi 1983) 
1. Illegal Money (IM): Take the predicted M1/M2 values for each period using the equation including the 
TTGDP variable. Then find the predicted M1/M2 values using the equation without the TTGDP variable. Take 
the difference between the two values for each period to find the amount of illegal money in the economy.  
(IM) = [EXP(M1/M2)TTGDP –  EXP(M1/M2)TTGDP ] x M2 
2. Legal Money (LM): Take M2 and subtract (IM) from it to find the amount of legal money in the economy. 
(LM) = M2 – (IM) 
3.  Velocity (V): GDP divided by legal money gives the velocity of money. Velocity of money is the rate at which 
money is exchanged from one transaction to another. Measures robustness of an economy. 
(V) = GDP / (LM) 
4. Shadow Economy (SE): Velocity multiplied by (IM) gives the size of the shadow economy. This is then 
divided into GDP to get a % of GDP number. 
(SE) = (V) x (IM)                  
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Appendix B - Results from Initial Model 
Correlation Matrix 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.996648595
R Square 0.993308422
Adjusted R Square 0.992750791
Standard Error 0.054935849
Observations 92
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 7 37.63106944 5.375867063 1781.299037 1.76126E‐88
Residual 84 0.253507594 0.003017948
Total 91 37.88457703
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 12.83770601 1.986720032 6.461758979 0.00000 8.886895347 16.78851667 8.886895347 16.78851667
TTGDP 0.38371676 0.140939005 2.722573211 0.00788 0.103444092 0.663989428 0.103444092 0.663989428
HFCE ‐5.660222124 0.307377584 ‐18.41455725 0.00000 ‐6.27147616 ‐5.048968089 ‐6.27147616 ‐5.048968089
D/M ‐0.582860127 0.079937576 ‐7.29144105 0.00000 ‐0.741824764 ‐0.423895489 ‐0.741824764 ‐0.423895489
SE 1.561592649 0.260147322 6.002724281 0.00000 1.044261168 2.078924129 1.044261168 2.078924129
lowest 0.007083781 0.002381494 2.97451178 0.00383 0.00234792 0.011819642 0.00234792 0.011819642
middle ‐0.018985581 0.003325245 ‐5.709529271 0.00000 ‐0.025598195 ‐0.012372968 ‐0.025598195 ‐0.012372968
M 1.054995207 0.03716381 28.38770351 0.00000 0.981090896 1.128899517 0.981090896 1.128899517
TTGDP HFCE r U D/M SE Tar EDU I 1st T low mid high IU M
TTGDP 1.000
HFCE ‐0.368 1.000
r ‐0.701 0.796 1.000
U 0.337 0.272 0.092 1.000
D/M ‐0.777 0.383 0.721 ‐0.516 1.000
SE ‐0.529 0.403 0.694 ‐0.356 0.868 1.000
Tar ‐0.517 0.348 0.615 ‐0.472 0.847 0.957 1.000
EDU 0.612 ‐0.638 ‐0.918 ‐0.149 ‐0.721 ‐0.757 ‐0.639 1.000
I ‐0.819 0.291 0.665 ‐0.617 0.955 0.821 0.825 ‐0.643 1.000
1st 0.035 0.372 0.207 0.748 ‐0.374 ‐0.497 ‐0.578 ‐0.109 ‐0.437 1.000
T ‐0.024 ‐0.064 0.109 ‐0.405 0.466 0.747 0.773 ‐0.233 0.432 ‐0.785 1.000
lowest 0.254 ‐0.431 ‐0.644 ‐0.096 ‐0.555 ‐0.810 ‐0.705 0.762 ‐0.482 0.216 ‐0.613 1.000
middle 0.061 ‐0.357 ‐0.445 ‐0.543 ‐0.083 ‐0.249 ‐0.115 0.529 ‐0.010 ‐0.308 ‐0.095 0.682 1.000
highest ‐0.427 0.735 0.826 0.212 0.595 0.705 0.599 ‐0.801 0.467 0.118 0.322 ‐0.758 ‐0.492 1.000
I‐USE 0.308 ‐0.049 ‐0.333 0.554 ‐0.719 ‐0.902 ‐0.914 0.439 ‐0.714 0.794 ‐0.921 0.672 0.063 ‐0.414 1.000
M 0.542 ‐0.510 ‐0.670 0.365 ‐0.865 ‐0.910 ‐0.914 0.660 ‐0.775 0.435 ‐0.665 0.645 0.097 ‐0.688 0.799 1.000
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Appendix C - Results from Adjusted Model 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.996973061
R Square 0.993955285
Adjusted R Square 0.993365556
Standard Error 0.052256382
Dickey‐Fuller ‐7.200929513
Durbin‐Watson 1.219067
Observations 91
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 8 36.81997805 4.602497257 1685.446062 1.41488E‐87
Residual 82 0.223919818 0.002730729
Total 90 37.04389787
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 12.26977758 2.076745564 5.908175654 0.00000 8.138469094 16.40108607
TTGDP 0.411632504 0.134940653 3.050470682 0.00308 0.14319256 0.680072449
HFCE ‐5.271341596 0.423085767 ‐12.45927424 0.00000 ‐6.112993964 ‐4.429689229
Dra/Mrk ‐0.468695283 0.085570994 ‐5.477268196 0.00000 ‐0.638923249 ‐0.298467317
SE 1.42000133 0.25588207 5.54943661 0.00000 0.910970378 1.929032281
lowest 0.006002373 0.002355876 2.547830364 0.01271 0.001315785 0.010688961
middle ‐0.01712606 0.003449688 ‐4.964524569 0.00000 ‐0.023988588 ‐0.010263532
M 1.001476467 0.057016399 17.56470929 0.00000 0.888052687 1.114900247
lagm1/m2 0.07262137 0.049280933 1.47362002 0.14441 ‐0.025414105 0.170656846  
 
Correlation Matrix 
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Appendix D - Shadow Economy Estimate Results 
 
 
Previous Estimations by Schneider 
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Appendix E - Data Points 
Data Point A: Law 2065/1992 
 The personal income tax code was changed and reduced the number of income tax 
brackets from nine to five. The goal of this was to capture revenue lost from tax evasion. 
This law seemed to have no effect on decreasing the shadow economy according to data 
generated in this study. 
Data Point B: Law 2214/1994 
 This law was aimed at restructuring the tax code to combat tax evasion. The most 
significant change was that the self-employed became taxed upon deemed income rather 
than declared income, which was not favored by the self-employed population. This 
applied mostly to farmers and unincorporated entrepreneurs. Objective criteria such as 
professional qualifications, size of staff, location, size, and utility bills all determined the 
deemed amount of taxable income. The corporate tax rate for companies not listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange increased to 40%. The data shows that this law was not 
successful in decreasing the shadow economy and in fact many businesses were able to 
abandon this method over this time period. 
Data Point C: Financial Crime Prosecution Force 
 In May of 1997 the Financial Crime Prosecution Force (SDOE) was created with help 
from the FBI. Its purpose was to crack down on contraband, money laundering, drug-
trafficking, illegal lending, and tax fraud. This organization was found to be fraudulent 
and compromised within weeks of it being created 
Data Point D: TAXIS Hardware Implementation 
 TAXIS audit hardware was purchased and began to be installed. Its purpose it to be able 
to store information, link tax centers throughout the country, and conduct specific cross-
checks on data. It was first implemented in 1997, not expected to be fully operational 
until 1999. In Q3 of 1999 only 50% of tax centers used the system, but it covered 85% of 
taxes. On January 1, 2000 it became fully operational and the cross checking system 
immediately caught many small taxpayers that had not been declaring parts of their 
income. According to the data generated in this study, there was still a 6% of GDP rise in 
the shadow economy over the next 3 years after full integration of the system, but after 
that point stabilization and steady declines occured. TAXIS is a major institutional and 
technological change that needed to happen in order to have better recording and cross-
checking capabilities. 
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Data Point E: Law 2873/2000 
 This law harmonized the corporate tax rate at 35%, and 30% for general and limited 
partnerships. According to data generated by this study, the shadow economy seemed to 
stabilize around 20-24% of GDP after implementation of this law, suggesting it was 
effective in stabilizing the rapid growth of shadow economy that was occurring prior. 
Data Point F: Law 3091/2002 
 This law changed the personal income tax code by removing two of the tax brackets, 
increasing the taxable income threshold, and increasing the income threshold for all tax 
brackets. All taxpayers close to the bottom portion of their tax bracket would have been 
bumped into a lower bracket, or out of taxable income altogether. However, the lowest 
tax rates have been removed, so now the lowest earners pay 15% on earnings rather than 
5%, and the threshold income for reaching 30% and 40% tax rates are much lower than 
previous. This study says that increasing the taxable income threshold would reduce the 
shadow economy, but it also says that increasing the rate on the lowest earners would 
increase it. Along with that the middle rate being raised could reduce the shadow 
economy as well, so it is unclear whether or not this policy was effective. The shadow 
economy stabilizes after this point and then begins to decline, suggesting that this policy 
may have been effective in combination with others. 
Data Point G: Law 3296/2004 
 This law was passed to step down the corporate tax rate to 32% from 35% by removing 
1% each calendar year. The shadow economy is continuing to decline during this time 
period, showing that this law may have helped with this reduction 
o Law 3301/2004 also passed during this time which forced all companies listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange to use IFRS accounting standards, another major 
institutional change that was needed in Greece 
Data Point H: POL 1087/2005 
 This policy lists 15-point criteria that will trigger the audit of a firm or individual. While 
this list is not available to the public, the data shows that since the shadow economy is 
continuing to decline at this time, so this criteria most likely helped with the decrease by 
making it easier to identify those involved in shadow activities 
o The New Democrat government declared that the Financial Crimes Prosecution 
Force had become corrupt so it was replaced with the Special Controls Service 
(YPEE). The YPEE has extensive powers to confiscate data, confiscate property, 
and freeze bank accounts. This is another major institutional change that was done 
to remove corruption and decrease the shadow economy. The data shows decline 
during this time period so it can be argued that this was effective. 
Has Government Tax Policy in Greece Led to a Large Shadow Economy? 
Senior Capstone Project for Nils Thompson 
‐ 30 ‐ 
 
Data Point I: Law 3522/2006 
 This law changed personal taxation by first of all increasing the level of tax-free earnings. 
The reduced the tax burden on low income earners, which should lower the shadow 
economy. Secondly it consolidated and expanded rates into three rates of 29%, 39%, and 
40% for the highest earners. The rates stepped down by 1% each year until in 2009 they 
were 25,%, 35%, and 40%. The data shows the shadow economy decreasing during this 
time period, most likely because of the decreased tax burden on lowest earners 
Data Point J: Law 3697/2008 
  This law continues the step-down of the corporate tax by bringing to down to 20% in 
2014 through a 1% annual decrease 
o Law 3943/2011 accelerated this process by immediately dropping the rate to 20%. 
The shadow economy has been stable since this point according to the data 
Data Point K: Major Tax Reform that has seemed to stabilize the shadow economy around 13%  
 Law 3888/2010: This law provided an amnesty for those firms that have not yet been 
audited but would receive penalty if they were. They would receive lower tax rates than 
they are supposed to receive 
 Law 3900/2010: Court cases involving bribery of tax, social security, and customs 
officials were to be accelerated since the process was very time consuming previously 
 Law 3845/2010: A crisis levy was applied to profitable companies in order to generate 
revenue to help with the Greek austerity crisis 
 Law 3842/2010: This was the most major tax reform of this time period by issuing a 
steeply progressive tax system that rises steeper as income increases. The tax free 
allowance has also been reduced. It is unknown yet from the data what the effect on the 
shadow economy has been.  
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